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ABSTRACT: The Protagoras features the fi rst known venture into detailed textual inter-
pretation in the Western intellectual tradition. Yet if Socrates is to be taken at his word 
at the close of his hermeneutic contest with Protagoras, this venture is to be regarded 
as a playful demonstration of the worthlessness of texts for aiding in the pursuit of 
knowledge. This essay is an attempt to view Socrates’ puzzling remarks on this point 
within their dramatic and historical contexts. I argue that, far from having us lay our 
inherited texts aside, we can fi nd in the Protagoras a reorientation to the linked activi-
ties of reading and dialogue, where we need not be forced to choose between merely 
using our own unaided voices and relying upon the (textual) voices of others in the 
project of philosophic education.
At the center of the Protagoras, we the readers fi nd ourselves suddenly im-plicated in the drama of Plato’s text. In fact, we discover that we have been 
implicated all along, from the moment we began to read and interpret the dialogue. 
For in the space of a short passage, the very value of our activity as invested read-
ers is put into question, and along with it, the epistemic value of the dialogues 
themselves. The passage begins at the close of Socrates’ extended interpretation 
of an ode by Simonides, an interpretation that in Protagoras’s eyes would mark 
Socrates as a man of high education. Oddly, Socrates moves to dismiss the entire 
hermeneutical exercise by likening it to the fruitless pastimes of the uneducated. 
The latter, he states, who are unable to hold a gathering amongst themselves by 
means of their own voices, must bring in an external voice, such as the melody of 
fl utes, or, as Socrates implies, the composition of a poet, to entertain themselves. 
He goes on to say, at 347e,
And so a gathering like this of ours, when it includes such men as most of 
us claim to be, requires no extraneous voices, not even of the poets, whom 
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one cannot question on that which they say; when they are brought forth in 
discussion we are generally told by some that the poet thought one thing, 
and by others, another, and they go on arguing about a matter which they are 
powerless to determine. No, this sort of meeting is avoided by fi ne and good 
men, who prefer to converse through each other, and by giving and taking, 
to test one another in their own logoi. It is this sort of person that you and I 
should imitate (mimei`sqai); putting the poets aside, let us hold our discus-
sion together from ourselves, making trial of the truth and ourselves.
The thrust of Socrates’ words is that we cannot properly access the wisdom of a 
text where the author is not present to give an account of the thinking (diavnoia) 
that informs it. In the absence of any hermeneutical authority, what constitutes 
a correct apprehension of a text’s meaning is the accurate correspondence of the 
reader’s understanding to that of the writer. Since this ideal of meaning lies out-
side of our grasp, there is no way to confi rm or deny the ‘true reading’ of a text. 
Consequently, the task of ascertaining the ‘truth’ of written logoi is pointless, unless 
the author can be brought in to explain his or her own words in further detail. Yet 
where this is possible, what has been composed, the text itself, thereby becomes 
superfl uous. Reading, then, or even discussing what has been written, may be a 
pleasurable exercise, as the beauty of poetic texts often reminds us. But where 
ethical knowledge is concerned, it seems, we are forced to apprehend it through 
other avenues more trustworthy than through mute words on a page.
Socrates’ objection to the practice of hermeneutics has serious implications 
not only for the educative value of the poetic tradition, but for the value of all 
inherited textual sources. In view of this criticism, the absence of interpretive 
authority remains a problem for every piece of writing that survives its author. 
If Socrates is to be taken literally in this claim, then we are compelled thereby to 
question our very practice of reading Plato; the Protagoras, as well as the rest of 
the dialogues, appears to be relegated to the status of extraneous voices no less 
than the poems of Simonides. Are we forced to conclude, with Plato’s help, that 
we’ve been wasting our time by looking for truths therein? It may be objected, 
of course, that it is due precisely to this weakness of hermeneutics that Plato 
set his ideas forth in dialogue form, allowing us to experience more clearly the 
meanings intended by each character through a kind of reenactment of living 
speech. Yet this objection would only set for itself the further, more daunting task 
of explaining why there continues to be a considerable diversity of interpretations 
of his work. If this were Plato’s intent in writing dialogues, then clearly something 
has gone awry. A reference to Socrates’ telling statement in the Phaedrus assures 
us that this could hardly have been Plato’s plan: “He who thinks, then, that he 
has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that 
anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person” 
(275c). We must, then, acknowledge the fact that Plato chose to write, and chose 
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this occupation with an awareness that his texts would in all likelihood outlive 
him. Moreover, he wrote with a particular fondness for irony and subtlety, both 
of which demand studied interpretation on the part of his audience.1 Bearing 
this in mind, the need to confront Socrates on his devaluation of texts becomes 
all the more acute. Unfortunately, most studies on the Protagoras have given this 
problem limited attention at best.2
The fact that the interpretive exercise in the Protagoras is directed to a work 
of poetry holds special signifi cance for the teachability of virtue. Protagoras’s 
proposal of competing over the better interpretation of Simonides refl ects the 
status that poetry was coming to occupy within the new rubric of sophistic 
education in the late fi fth century. The pre-democratic practice of looking to 
the poetic tradition in order to ground a communal ethos was losing its validity 
where the very notion of ajrethv, and how to achieve it, had become a matter of 
public debate. Poetic wisdom, as Socrates’ generation encountered it, was already 
under conversion to an object of critique, and poetry to mere didactic material for 
the ends of persuasive technique.3 At the center of the Protagoras, we are treated 
to a reenactment in miniature of this sophistic appropriation of poetry. In this 
contest of interpretation, the fate of the poetic tradition is to be decided. Socrates’ 
elaborate hermeneutical efforts to “restore Simonides,” as he puts it (340a), would 
seem to represent a reinstatement of poetry in its role as the safeguard of virtue. 
Yet his concluding dismissal of the entire effort commits Socrates, to all appear-
ances, to subverting the poetic tradition more radically than even sophistry is 
able to: not only should a body of poetic works cease to function as a guide for 
civic education (paideiva), but it should be cast aside altogether. Bereft of any 
true interpretive authority, the only alternative for coming to an understanding 
of virtue is to look solely to each other, removing ourselves from textual sources 
and using our own voices to settle the question of the good.
The object of this essay is to attempt a recovery of this perplexing passage in 
the Protagoras, and to determine what speaking in one’s own voice can mean in 
light of Socrates’ remarks on interpretation. I will begin by placing the character 
of Protagoras, as Plato portrays him, into relation with the poetic tradition that he 
seeks to overturn. That is, I shall examine how the model of sophistic education 
that he represents opposes the very essence of learning afforded through written 
works. From this vantage point, we can understand how Socrates’ dismissal of 
texts is better read as a veiled critique of both the practice of sophistic paideiva 
represented by Protagoras, and the tradition of poetic authority that precedes 
it. Lastly, I will argue that for Socrates, fi nding one’s own voice, as an alternative 
between these two poles, does not entail turning away from the orphaned texts 
of the poets, let alone those of Plato, but rather serves as a preparation for re-
sponsibly adopting texts for ourselves through a critical engagement with them 
in philosophical practice.
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THE EROTIC AND THE MIMETIC IN POETIC EDUCATION
In the latter portions of what has been called Protagoras’s ‘great speech,’4 the 
eminent sophist explains to Socrates, and to the rest of those present at Callias’s 
gathering, how it is that ajrethv is not only capable of being taught, but how such 
instruction has already become an institution in Athenian aristocratic society. 
Almost offhandedly, he states that once the young have come to understand what 
has been written, as before they understood only the voice, they are given the 
works of good poets to read and learn by heart. He continues: “Here they meet 
with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good 
men in times past, so that the youth might out of envy imitate (mimh`tai) them 
and yearn to become even as they” (325e–326a). What we receive here is an ac-
count of the place of poetic works in the early stages of education, as a stimulus 
for play through the re-enactment of models of virtue. According to Protagoras’s 
own account, learning includes not only the power of memorization, but also the 
mimetic drive to recreate what has as yet only superfi cially been grasped.
This observance of the mimetic component in education is certainly not a 
theme unique to the Protagoras; Plato devotes a substantial portion of books 
two and three of the Republic to this very phenomenon, and a brief look at the 
Republic is instructive here for a more extensive understanding of what takes 
place in the educative mimesis of which Protagoras speaks. In his discussion with 
Adeimantus in book three, Socrates outlines the dangers of improper poetry for 
the souls of the young, where the pupil “gets a taste for the being [of a model] 
from its imitation. Or haven’t you heard,” he continues, “that imitations, if they 
are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits and 
nature, in body and sounds and thought?” (Rep., 395d). In essence, the young 
learner takes on the depictions and ideas represented in poetry, climbing inside, 
as it were, the models found therein. One attempts to see oneself and the world 
through the eyes of heroes and other men of praise, testing out one’s capacities 
in accordance with the patterns of speech and action that exemplify noble behav-
ior. That is, one pretends, to a greater or lesser extent, that he or she is Achilles, 
Odysseus, or Athena, and in this pretension to be what one is not yet, a certain 
inclination to self-transformation is kindled, where the learner “gets a taste” for, 
that is, learns to desire, that imitated persona. Mimesis in this sense is carried 
out as a twofold relation to these textual models, both in the sphere of action as 
well as in the domain of thought. It is not merely a playful reproduction limited 
to the outward expression of particular kinds of behavior where one maintains a 
clear distinction between what one really believes and what one does; it is also an 
expression of as-yet unformulated opinions about what is desirable and worthy of 
pursuit, of opinions about self and world that are gradually taken on and refi ned 
in and through the process of reenactment.
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The conception of mimesis that we are dealing with, then, is that of an in-
cipient form of understanding on the part of the learner. It involves more than 
comportment as a kind of likeness or copy, and therefore more than simple rep-
etition of form; one ultimately desires to bring the world to light in a particular 
way through a personal investment in the ideas of a text. Insofar as these textual 
models are engaged mimetically by the learner in the context of his or her own 
surroundings, they provide him or her with a general structure according to which 
specifi c possibilities for expressing noble behavior in a given situation can be 
made evident. In this sense, the text places specifi c limits upon its reader, guiding 
and informing one’s understanding through what is revealed to the learner in his 
or her creative act of imitation. Protagoras’s reference to the pupil’s “yearning to 
become” (ojrevghtai toiou`to~ genevsqai), and Socrates’ observation about 
the soul’s acquiring a “taste for being,” in the encounter with these texts both bear 
witness to the erotic attachment intrinsic to mimetic learning. Eros, as the source 
of our strivings, emerges here as the specifi c desire to become good, to transform 
oneself with an eye to possessing those human qualities presented as valuable 
and praiseworthy through an active imitation of virtuous living.
Young Hippocrates serves as an embodiment of this desire in the opening of 
the dialogue, already in a state of frenzy at the prospect of studying with Protago-
ras, who would allow him to become better through the possession of sophistic 
wisdom. In his desire to become like Protagoras, highly esteemed by the many, 
the fi gure of Hippocrates gestures to the implicit question that arises alongside 
his yearning. He knows, only in the vaguest sense, what he wants: to possess that 
wisdom which would grant him distinction and excellence in the polis. As Socrates 
takes a moment to calm his young friend by questioning him about the ends of 
this desire, it becomes clear that Hippocrates has not yet properly asked after 
the nature of what it is that he desires, but rather how he can acquire it. His eros 
exemplifi es the process of educative mimesis to the extent that such imitation 
begins with the question of how it is to be this or that model of virtue, how the 
world appears from the embodied standpoint of the desired qualities fi rst com-
municated through poetic works. The process of mimesis brings forth a set of 
tacit and provisional answers to this question, answers under continual revision 
as one experiences the world through trying out the set of paradigms and maxims 
provided in exemplary texts. Yet as Socrates’ questions to Hippocrates indicate, 
where it is a matter of leading one’s own life, the questioning intrinsic to mimesis 
must be developed and properly directed.5 This redirection entails a recognition 
of the priority of certain questions over others, as is made clear in the course of 
the dialogue, where the question of whether ajrethv can be taught gives way to 
the more primary question of what ajrethv itself is.6 This ability to clearly pose 
and order a set of questions, to discern a necessary priority in questioning, is for 
Socrates an essential aspect of paideiva.
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The primary benefi t of civic paideiva grounded upon the poetic tradition 
consisted in the fact that these textual models for imitation served a cohesive 
social function for the polis. Where desire on the part of the young was directed 
to a particular set of ideals sanctioned by political or divine authority, the general 
ethos of society could be subtended by common, if vaguely construed, notions of 
virtue. However, due to the fact that the popular ethos in turn plays a role in how 
the poets are to be understood, the lessons and ideals of poetry are left open to 
manipulation in line with the popular trends in each successive age. Deciding what 
the poets meant, then, was not unrelated to the question of where the power and 
interests of the polis lay. As Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, “Plato’s Socratic insight 
was that a binding political ethos, which would assure the proper application and 
interpretation of poetry, no longer existed once sophism had come to defi ne the 
spirit of education.”7 By the time of the Protagoras, as the gathering of sophists 
in Callias’s home suggests, the popular morality in Athens was already in a state 
of decline.8 The obvious antagonism amongst the sophists—Protagoras’s early 
disparaging remarks directed toward Hippias, as well as Prodicus’s willing par-
ticipation in showing up Protagoras’s knowledge of Simonides—reinforces the 
notion that the willing pupil could pursue any of a number of divergent paths for 
learning civic virtue at the time. In Hippocrates, the potential student, we see a 
portrait of mimetic eros left to fi nd its way in the erosion of traditional authority 
on virtue, amidst these competing claims to wisdom and the circulation of new 
doctrines and forms of education within the Athenian aristocracy. Socrates cau-
tions the young man to consider the lack of knowledge he has of Protagoras, and 
as we fi nd, it is not only the source of his desired education that must be taken 
into account, but the conception of wisdom that underlies it.
Thus far, we have been concerned with the role of texts that project embodied 
moral ideals in the formative stages of education, according to Plato’s lights, as a 
process characterized by erotic attachment: through the phenomenon of mimesis 
as the primary mode of learning, the integration of desired forms of behavior 
into one’s own life calls forth at the same time both inquiry and understanding. 
It is, as I will argue in the following section, precisely the essential relation of 
understanding and questioning to eros that is at stake in Hippocrates’ decision 
to study with Protagoras.
THE IMAGE OF THE SOPHIST
Socrates’ characterization of sophistry in the dialogue is composed of two parts. 
The fi rst comes at the opening scene of Socrates’ retelling, and the second comes 
by way of insincere praise just following Protagoras’s great speech. After admon-
ishing Hippocrates for not consulting those who most care for him before going 
to Protagoras, Socrates warns that the art he aspires to learn is not nearly so 
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lofty as its name suggests. “Can it happen,” he asks, “that the sophist is really a 
sort of merchant or dealer in the wares on which a soul is nourished? For this is 
what he appears to me” (313c). In answer to Hippocrates’ immediate question, 
Socrates goes on to state that the wares on which a soul is nourished are lessons 
(maqhvmata) that the sophist keeps in stock, carting them from one town to 
another. What is more, in order to sell his wares, any merchant may well sell them 
to anyone looking to buy, in many cases ignorant of the good or ill effects that 
a particular item of sale might have on the soul of his patron. The sophist is, in 
Socrates’ eyes, no exception.
In order to determine whether Protagoras belongs to that class of sophists 
who do not know whether a given logos of theirs is good or bad for the soul, one 
would either have to possess at the outset a fi rm knowledge of goodness and evil, 
or one would have to experience the effects of that logos by attempting to live in 
accord with it. In the fi rst case, one would have to be a “physician of the soul,” 
as Socrates puts it, one who can already bring his or her life into a secure path 
toward the true notion of the good (313e). Of course, if there were anyone fi tting 
this description, he or she would have little need of what Protagoras is trying to 
sell. In the second case, one puts oneself at the risk of living one’s life according 
to false wisdom and damaging one’s own soul in the process. As luck would have 
it, Protagoras saves us from these two options at a further point in the dialogue 
by refusing to offer a single defi nition of the good, saying instead that it is both 
elusive and manifold (poikivlon . . . kai; pantodapovn) (334a–c). That is, 
the good is to be determined situationally, according to individual perspective. 
In what he takes at the time to be a shrewd evasive move away from Socrates’ 
questions about a human good, Protagoras unknowingly relieves himself of the 
authority he claims to make others better.
The fact that Protagoras is unable to determine the good or ill of his teach-
ings is to be taken here as evidence for where he stands with respect to his own 
speeches. Unlike the mimetic comportment to texts that we’ve discussed above, 
wherein one attempts to understand the wisdom of the poets by living in accor-
dance with the ideas presented, the sophist maintains an external relation to the 
maqhvmata that he sells. He fails to grasp their ethical import not because he 
lacks the suffi cient intelligence, but because he has not been moved to investigate 
and to test the meaning of these logoi in the context of his own life. Where the 
learner engages a text mimetically, seeking the meaning of virtuous deeds pro-
vided therein through acting them out, such enactment provides a rudimentary 
understanding, and what is more, a kind of interpretation through play. Seen thus, 
interpretation is undertaken as a mode of questioning; it asks what a text has 
to reveal to one on the basis of his or her own experiences, beliefs, and ways of 
thinking. To the extent that one asks what a text can mean, one attempts, though 
in a more sophisticated manner than the playful child, to integrate it into one’s 
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thought, to test out its possibilities for meaning through the questions that it 
opens up. Protagoras, on the other hand, by virtue of his remove from his teach-
ings, exhibits a lack of the very desire and concern necessary to this search. As a 
proclaimed authority on virtue, his role, to all appearances, is not to put himself 
or his speeches into question, but to provide set answers, techniques, and even 
accounts of model behavior to his students.
In answer to the initial question of their exchange, Protagoras mockingly 
replies to Socrates in the course of the great speech, “Seeing that so much care is 
taken in both private and public virtue, do you wonder (qaumavzei~), Socrates, 
and fi nd yourself in an aporia, that virtue may be taught? Surely there is no reason 
to wonder at that” (326e). Wonder, as we recall from the Theaetetus, is for Socrates 
the very beginning of philosophy, the ground of seeking to know.9 The character 
of Protagoras functions to stem this spirit of wonder and its provocation to ques-
tioning throughout the dialogue, to the point at which the possibility of having a 
dialogue at all seems to be endangered. And as a result of the sophist’s own lack 
of wonder with respect to his logos on the teachability of ajrethv, it is Socrates’ 
task to push the discussion forward by fi rst wondering at what Protagoras takes 
ajrethv to be (329c).
The second part of the sophist’s characterization by Socrates serves to 
supplement and deepen the question of Protagoras’s relation to his own logoi. 
As a merchant of maqhvmata, the sophist must have in tow a stock of prepared 
speeches and techniques to present to his patrons. His method of teaching entails 
deciding which of the texts stored in his memory is appropriate for a particular 
situation, and then reproducing it in speech for his audience. At the conclusion of 
Protagoras’s initial performance, which includes both a modifi ed myth by Hesiod 
and a lengthy argument following it, Socrates remarks that similar speeches can 
be heard by various talented public speakers, including Pericles. “But suppose 
you put a question to one of them,” he states, “they are just like books, incapable 
of either answering you or putting a question of their own; if you question even 
a small point in what has been said, [they hold forth again] just as brazen vessels 
ring a long time after they have been struck and prolong the note unless you put 
your hand on them” (329a). Turning to Protagoras, Socrates appeals to his own 
desire for the sophist to distinguish himself from these public speakers by giving 
brief answers when questioned, as well as waiting and accepting answers to the 
questions that Protagoras wishes to pose. However, Protagoras disregards this 
appeal, foremost by asserting his right to present his case in the form of extended, 
elusive speech just prior to the breakdown of the conversation at 334e, even in 
the face of Socrates’ protestations that he cannot follow Protagoras’s points.10 The 
draw of the sophist’s speeches, as Socrates hints early in the dialogue, has to do 
less with their degree of clarity and educative function than in the enchanting 
effect of the voice through which they come, which mesmerizes his students into 
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following wherever it leads.11 At the close of the great speech, Socrates admits 
to being caught, if not wholly, under the sway of this enchanting effect, yet his 
attunement to what has been said, rather than to the manner in which it has 
been spoken, allows him an ability to question what is foreclosed for those who 
remain mesmerized.
In giving his great speech, what Protagoras takes to be an answer to Socrates’ 
query is hardly the answer that Socrates had asked for. The request was originally 
for an ejpivdeixi~, a demonstration, that ajrethv is teachable (320b). And what 
Protagoras gives, rather, is an argument for how ajrethv must be teachable; while 
Protagoras does offer an answer, therefore, it is not an answer that responds to the 
sense of Socrates’ question. It cannot be determined upon hearing the extended 
logos how it is that anyone has been made better by it; for the question of what 
virtue is has not even been broached. While the audience approves highly of his 
performance, Protagoras has only supplied them with the familiar, if modifi ed, 
myth of Prometheus, and an explanation of Athenian customs that refl ect their 
own belief that virtue can be taught. Long and winding, at points confused and at 
others brilliant, the great speech functions, in the end, to make its hearers forget 
the sense of their own question. We see in the course of the discussion following 
his speech, that when compelled to give short, concise replies to Socrates’ ques-
tions on the intricacies of what has already been said, Protagoras shows himself 
unwilling to explain his case in the sort of detail that would clearly delimit the 
concept of virtue for his listeners.
These points underscore the implicit picture of knowledge possessed by the 
sophist primarily as the possession of logoi held in one’s memory.12 Insofar as 
one can call up prepared speeches from a storage room in the soul, providing one 
extended answer after another when questioned, he or she is to be counted as 
wise. This portrait of sophistic technique reduces the movement of thinking to 
mere reproduction of speeches that remain distant from invested understanding, 
and dialogue to the simple transfer of propositions and stories from one memory 
to another.13 Where Protagoras is pressured at several points in the dialogue to 
give his own thoughts on the subject under discussion, he appears to be no bet-
ter than the layperson at supporting his answers.14 That Socrates must explicitly 
ask for Protagoras’s own beliefs only substantiates the suspicion that Protagoras’s 
real thinking bears little or no relation to the logoi that others are to accept from 
him. If ‘brazen vessels’ ring on when we strike them, this only happens when the 
vessel is empty, and here Socrates’ analogy is particularly revealing. Because the 
sophist is unaware of the import of his teachings, his words have a hollow tone 
to them; they are not supported, not fi lled out, by clear convictions won through 
knowledge and experience. Much less than understanding and putting himself 
into a productively mimetic relation to the ideas in his own safeguarded texts, 
Protagoras’s eros reveals itself to be as inhibited as that of the eunuch who guards 
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the door to Callias’s home. He fails to exhibit sincere attention to the transforma-
tive process of becoming better through the desire to learn how to distinguish 
the good. Along with his claim to be an authority on teaching virtue, he must as 
well present himself as one who already possesses it.15
In contrast to the dynamic of productive mimesis sketched out in the previous 
section, the portrait of sophistry in the Protagoras reveals to us the mimetic drive 
in a degenerative form, where eros is restricted to repetition of memorized speech. 
If it is possible to identify in the sophist’s conception of knowledge elements of 
productive imitation, it would be the act of likening himself, as Socrates puts it, to 
a book. For a book does not have the power that its author has of reformulating its 
content, and attempting to clarify what is said with an eye to the understanding 
of the individual who puts questions to it. Where the author is not present, the 
thinking that produces words on a page cannot reveal itself other than through 
these same words. And since Socratic dialogue aims at a transformation in under-
standing through question and answer on the part of both speakers, in this sense, 
texts reveal their obvious limitations. This point recalls once more the critique of 
writing in the Phaedrus. With respect to written logoi, Socrates says to Phaedrus, 
“You might think they spoke as if they had intelligence (ti fronou`nta~), but 
if you question them, wishing to know what is said, they always say one and the 
same thing. . . . [E]ach word, when ill-treated or unjustly reviled, always needs its 
father to help it, for it has the power neither to protect nor help itself ” (275d–e). 
Although we have little indication in the Protagoras of whether the sophist had 
composed his speeches himself, to the extent that he fails to explain further what 
is meant in them or clarify what remains obscure, Protagoras, though present, 
appears to be a deadbeat father of his logoi, if he is their father at all. This applies 
not only to his speeches on the sophistic tradition, the great speech on education, 
as well as those on the elusiveness of the good and the relation between strength 
and power, but also to many of the shorter answers that Protagoras is compelled 
to give. Despite his frequent emphasis in the great speech on the care necessary 
for civic education (ejpimevleia, care, is mentioned no less than ten times in this 
passage), his evasiveness and his caution in the face of potential self-contradic-
tion betray a care more for the maintenance of his authority and reputation than 
a care for self-transformation in light of the question of virtue. If Hippocrates 
represents an eros for learning cut free from the guidance of traditional authori-
ties on ajrethv, Protagoras conversely embodies unquestionable authority cut off 
from this eros. This aspect of Protagoras’s thinking reveals itself nowhere more 
clearly than in the hermeneutical contest he arranges with Socrates.
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THE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION
After the dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras has run aground due to a 
disagreement about how long one’s answers should be, a provisional agreement 
is reached wherein each of them is able to take turns questioning and answer-
ing the other. In this way, Socrates hopes to teach the sophist how a successful 
dialogue, one aimed at shared learning, can be carried out. This arrangement 
also provides Protagoras with the opportunity to distinguish himself from those 
other booklike public speakers, who cannot pose questions of their own. To begin 
with, he states: “I believe, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man’s education is 
to be formidable in the matter of verses. That is, to be able to apprehend, in what 
is said by the poets, what has been correctly and incorrectly composed, and to 
know how to separate them and give a logos upon them when questioned” (339a). 
Accordingly, he takes up an ode to Scopas composed by Simonides, citing the fi rst 
few lines before asking Socrates whether he believes the poem to be fi nely and 
correctly composed. Upon hearing Socrates’ assent, a second question is posed, 
namely whether a poem can be so if it contradicts itself, to which Socrates answers 
in the negative. Protagoras goes on to recite several following lines of the ode, 
in an effort to show that Simonides has, in fact produced a contradiction with 
respect to the nature of goodness, where he writes both that: “For a man, indeed, 
to become good truly is hard,” and afterward, “Nor does it ring true to me that 
word of Pittacus, though it was a wise man who spoke, Hard it is, he said, to be 
good” (339a–c). Unfortunately for Protagoras, his certainty that the claims are 
opposed arises from a careless confusion of the meanings of being (e[mmenai) 
and becoming (genevsqai), such that he believes Simonides to be saying that it 
both is and is not hard to become good. What follows is a sustained, and at points 
comic, interpretation of the whole of the poem by Socrates in an effort to show 
how these two terms are meant to be not only distinct but pivotal for Simonides 
in pursuing the human good. While a thorough treatment of the interpretation 
cannot be ventured here, I would like instead to draw out a few implications of the 
approach that Protagoras takes to the poem, and use these as keys to understand-
ing why Socrates is moved to discount his own hermeneutic performance.
In what is to be a renewed attempt at giving and taking logoi, of questioning 
and answering in turn, the questions that Protagoras poses to Socrates are not true 
questions in the strict sense. They can hardly be said to arise out of the acknowl-
edgement of one’s own ignorance and the subsequent wonder that brings forth 
philosophical questioning, given that Protagoras already has answers prepared 
for them. Rather than asking along with Socrates what the poem has to reveal 
about the good, what the meaning of the poem might be in light of a shared at-
tempt to understand it in its wholeness, Protagoras stops short in encountering 
what he takes to be an inconsistency, and thereby dismisses the poem as poorly 
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composed. The correctness in poetry of which he speaks takes its fi rst criterion 
from the formal requirements of a sound logos, where the content of what is to 
be made manifest goes largely untouched. As a result, the value of the ‘failed’ 
poem can only lie in serving as an instructional lesson about the validity and 
invalidity of logoi. His questions, then, only recapitulate the process of calling 
forth ready-made maqhvmata to then be fi led away again for later use in debate. 
Such is the primary dynamic of sophistic knowledge in the Protagoras, as I hope 
to have shown at this point.
However, Protagoras’s invocation of a kind of poetic correctness tells us some-
thing about the works that he would regard as “correctly composed,” as Socrates 
goes on to show the poem at hand to be according to the sophist’s criterion.16 In 
Socrates’ fi rst playful attempt to distinguish Simonides’ two statements, saying that 
perhaps Prodicus and others would agree with the words of Hesiod that becoming 
good is hard, but possessing virtue thereafter is easy, Protagoras criticizes this 
distinction on the grounds that possessing virtue is rather the most diffi cult of 
things, “as it is opined by all men,” (340d–e). Socrates’ interpretation is refuted by 
reference to predetermined opinions about virtue, which is precisely the matter, 
for Socrates, still in question. Along with logical self-consistency as a necessary 
condition of proper composition, then, the wisdom of a text must as well be con-
sistent with popular belief, with what is already taken to be true. It is not simply 
that the individual can go on to seek the poem’s meaning for him or herself once 
the work is found to be consistent, but that here a single authoritative meaning 
is to be used for determining what counts as a proper interpretation. That is, all 
that a work has to say to us has, in Protagoras’s thinking, already been grasped; 
its meaning has been settled, and education in verses consists in retracing in 
thought the proper understanding of the text. A correct ‘solution’ of a poem would 
then be the correspondence to a predetermined meaning that exists, as it were, 
behind the work. Reading poetry, in this conception, amounts to compelling a 
text to say the same thing in each engagement with it, to elicit the same answer. 
Once this answer is revealed, the poem ceases to confront us in its dimension of 
questionability; the erotic comportment in which we may have fi rst approached 
it has been put to rest through the correct answer to its meaning.
It is, I believe, with reference to this notion of correctness that Socrates ironi-
cally disowns his belabored interpretation. If a single, correct meaning of a text 
is to be confi rmed, one can only look for such authority from the author himself, 
from the one whose diavnoia has informed the work at hand. Only then might 
a poem’s ‘answer’ be procured, and so become an example of knowledge in the 
sophist’s repertoire. In this expectation of a conclusive answer to the meaning of 
a work, the absence of the poet robs the interpretive exercise of its value, making 
it, in the end, a pointless venture.17
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We might ask, however, what if Simonides were present? What if he were to 
be consulted on the true sense of what is said in the poem? We need only consult 
the Apology to see the depth of Socrates’ irony here. Upon engaging different 
men held to be wise, Socrates relates that the poets were no better at giving an 
account of their poems than any layperson present. “I presently recognized this, 
that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and by 
inspiration, like the prophets and the givers of oracles; for these also say many 
fi ne things, but know none of the things they say” (22c). Socrates’ protestation 
that the poet is not in attendance to guide their interpretations gestures, I believe, 
to the fact that the wisdom of the poets is in a certain sense authorless; there is 
never any interpretive authority, any fi nal ideal of meaning, to be sought in the 
tradition of poetry, whether the poet is present to be consulted or not. As seekers 
of ajrethv, we likewise face a tradition that of itself possesses no voice by which 
its texts may be aided for the understanding of the interpreter. Even if tradition 
possessed its own set of authoritative voices, what help these voices could offer 
is subject to our hermeneutical efforts no less than the texts they would attempt 
to explain. What we have at our disposal instead is a multiplicity of voices with 
which to seek meaning, a community of interpretive voices that do not stop short 
of each other, as Protagoras’s relativism would have it, but intermingle with one 
another, seeking a collective, yet open-ended determination of meaning through 
which the coherence of a work may be made manifest.
In the context of Simonides’ poem, we can therefore see how Protagoras’s con-
fusion of meaning in the lines at issue plays itself out on the level of his conception 
of knowledge. According to Socrates’ interpretation, being good is impossible 
for humans, and reserved only for unchanging, timeless divinities, whereas be-
coming good is the only goal that we temporal, transitory creatures can pose for 
ourselves. Since, he adds, lack of knowledge is the real source of faring badly, our 
inability to hold fast to knowledge “through time, labor, illness, or some other 
accident,” relegates us to the sphere of becoming, we are subject in our mental 
as well as our physical lives to this condition of continual acquisition and loss of 
whatever we hope to preserve (345b). To believe, therefore, that knowledge of a 
text, like knowledge of the good, is a cognitive possession of meaning, persisting 
unchanged and selfsame in one’s memory, is to confuse becoming with being in 
the most crucial sense. Where a script or a statement, either in writing or in one’s 
memory, exists just as it is, our engagement with its content in thought, as the 
process of knowing, is a process to be carried out anew in every act of thinking. 
A text does not subsist as an object of knowledge in virtue of being retained as a 
mental property that can be recalled at any moment; it becomes known to us not 
in the act of recalling it, but rather in the movement of thinking it through and 
clarifying it for ourselves. The fact that ongoing experiences and developments 
in our understanding unavoidably reform our perspectives means that each 
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involvement with a text, each attempt to understand it in its coherence and with 
a care for its limits of sense, is not a mere repetition of meaning, as Protagoras 
would instruct us, but instead necessitates a new formulation of it.18 This process 
of understanding thus constitutes a form of adoption by the reader; we assume a 
position of responsibility for the meaning of text in the acts of engagement and 
interpretation through a care for what the text can bring to light. The questioning 
that marks real engagement with the content of a text is for Socrates much less 
seeking to accord with its words or with an authoritative interpretation than it is 
a mutual relation of becoming; both the meaning of the text and the knowing of 
its interpreter undergo transformation in dialectical engagement.19
Such transformation on Protagoras’s part is foregone where opposition rears 
its head, both with respect to the lines of the poem, as well as in his own logoi. 
A self-contradiction is taken, in his case, as evidence of an ignorance that is 
to be avoided at all costs. In addition, where two individuals may respectively 
possess ideas that oppose those of the other, the doctrine of relativity given by 
Protagoras sees to it that these confl icting viewpoints need not be questioned, 
but accepted, since there is simply nothing further to be discussed. His implicit 
idea of education demands precisely that one has set to memory a collection of 
logoi that agree with one another, without demanding that there be intersubjec-
tive agreement about them. Where Socrates is concerned, however, the discovery 
of such opposition, either within oneself, or between interlocutors, is the fi rst 
opportunity to let the matter at hand show itself in its questionability, to open 
itself to the possibility of being addressed anew. Being, as we have seen, devoid 
of the eros that marks the fi rst step in learning, the sophist is unable to see that 
fi nding oneself in the position of aporia is an occasion for wonder and a desire 
to know through subsequent investigation. In this light, Socrates’ dismissal of 
interpretation and the appeal to converse in one’s own voice are to be understood, 
I believe, as a response to Protagoras’s inability to engage in real dialogue in ac-
cordance with their agreement. If questioning and the confrontation of one’s own 
real doubt are necessary to the project of dialogue, they are no less necessary to 
the task of interpretation.
Charles Griswold takes Socrates’ move away from the poets as a lesson about 
the inherent limits of education through texts: “In the standard game of exege-
sis, Socrates is suggesting, neither the exegete nor the author whose works are 
explained can be questioned or refuted. Neither has his or her own voice or helps 
the other to fi nd his or hers.”20 This criticism holds, however, only when a standard 
of correctness for interpretation like that used by Protagoras is put into play, that 
is, when the single, “true” meaning of a work is assumed or expected. Where the 
interpreter takes on the responsibility of a particular reading, where he or she can 
give and defend reasons for understanding a poem in a certain way, this by no 
means results in an impasse for dialogue about the truth of the work. In making 
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the case for any given reading of a text, as well as in submitting the content of his or 
her interpretation to scrutiny (either by others or oneself), the reader is moved to 
investigate and develop views with regard to the work’s content. Yet such reading is 
premised upon a value for thoughtful and invested inquiry, which is conspicuously 
lacking in Protagoras’s comportment to the poem. A move away from the poets, 
in the context of Socrates’ discussion with the sophist, would then signify both 
a reorientation to the preliminaries of dialogue, on the one hand, and a tactical 
means of preserving an openness to the meanings brought forth in poetic works 
where such preliminaries have not yet been mastered, on the other.21
In his full-length study on the Protagoras, Larry Goldberg notes that by calling 
for those at the gathering to speak in their own voices, “Socrates is urging once 
again that the conversation be carried on in mutual cooperation with reference 
to inner conviction rather than in a spirit of warfare and with reference to the 
force of external authority.”22 While this statement is not incorrect, I believe that 
the dialogue supplies us with resources for saying more about what Socrates has 
in mind here with relying on one’s own voice. For if stating one’s inner convic-
tion about a matter is premised upon an invested attempt to understand it for 
oneself, as I have sought to make clear above, such understanding is not possible 
in the fi rst place without the prior act of placing that matter into question. We 
should bear in mind that Socrates’ insistence that they speak in their own voices 
was directed toward a mutual testing (pei`ran) of the truth and of themselves. 
This kind of testing is inaugurated, however, well before Protagoras enters the 
dialogue, where Socrates, “to test (ajpopeirwvmeno~) Hippocrates’ strength, 
[begins] examining and questioning him” (310b). Hippocrates, who had simply 
assumed the belief of others that Protagoras was the wisest in speech, is made to 
see, through the process of testing carried out by Socrates’ questions, the ques-
tionability of this opinion, and furthermore to see that this opinion is not truly 
his own. Only by being reduced to the state of aporia in this way could the young 
man begin to pose the question of Protagoras’s wisdom for himself, as a question 
deriving its meaning as a question from the awareness of his newfound ignorance. 
Accordingly, once the call for them to speak in their own voices is answered with 
silence, Socrates is compelled to explain: “Protagoras, in speaking with you, there 
is no other wish on my part than to examine these aporias that occur to me at 
each point. . . . [W]hat then could I do but call upon you in this examination by 
questioning and communication? There was no other way” (348c–349a). In car-
rying out an examination, in looking into the nature of something with the aim 
of grasping it in truth, there must be, as Socrates insists, an articulation of one’s 
own desire to know it that informs the very scope of one’s vision. It is, therefore, 
in being questioned that the matter at issue reveals itself to us in such a way that 
what was at fi rst taken for granted in our thinking now stands forth in its ques-
tionability, as if for the fi rst time; it exists for us as something alien amidst the 
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familiar, and as such, draws our thought into the openness of a new possibility 
for understanding.
It is for the sake of this new possibility for understanding ajrethv through 
questioning that Socrates calls for the use of their own voices. Dialogue, grasped 
as a form of mutual cooperation, is a means whereby two individuals can forge, 
through testing one another, an understanding that arises only where the open-
ness to the unfamiliar is preserved. Where such questioning is withheld, where 
dialogue becomes merely an exchange of convictions, the possibility of gaining 
knowledge about that which is to be questioned is foreclosed.23 Even in the very 
act of recalling an opinion, there must be at the same time a questioning, an open-
ness, that allows us to re-understand those ideas that led us to form or accept it. 
Without this relation between questioning and understanding, what we recall is 
little more to us than a hollow statement, and therefore an extraneous voice. Only 
by heeding the questionability borne out of aporia and the desire to understand 
can we begin, therefore, to fi nd a voice that is essentially our own.
In this light, the works that make up one’s tradition are to supply sites and 
opportunities for such questioning, no less than gatherings of inquisitive individu-
als. While Socrates obviously fi nds particular advantages in interlocution, this 
by no means excludes texts from being an incitement to investigate the truth of 
a given matter. We may, for example, encounter a text that appears to contradict 
itself, as Protagoras thinks the poem does; yet by taking the work seriously and 
investigating its apparent contradiction, we are moved to ask how what appears to 
disagree with itself might actually be self-consistent, gaining thereby, more often 
than not, a fuller, more nuanced understanding of the concepts involved therein. 
Or we may fi nd that while a work does not possess this failing, it does disagree 
with an accepted position on a particular issue, as, for example, Socrates’ inter-
pretation of Simonides leads to a disagreement with the opinion of the many on 
the nature of incontinence. We can then begin to comprehend more thoroughly 
the opposing position, and at the same time be obliged to rethink the validity of 
our own.24 Once the virtue of this illuminative mode of questioning is recognized, 
as Socrates attempts to teach Protagoras in his roundabout way, one seeking to 
understand virtue need not be stuck between the equally dubious alternatives of 
passively accepting the authoritative meaning of particular works or of relegating 
one’s tradition to an inaccessible self-enclosed—and therefore useless—region of 
the past. One can, rather, begin to read in a careful manner and pursue in thought 
and dialogue the questions that a text provokes. This is precisely the task that the 
Platonic dialogues set for us.
Orphaned and Adopted Texts in the Protagoras 17
NOTES
1. In the present case, the fact that the very practice of Plato’s reader is put into question, 
and therefore becomes a question for the reader, is evidence of an irony that is not 
limited to the characters of the text, but extends beyond the text itself to its audience. 
We are told, essentially, that what we are doing by reading the Protagoras is not ethi-
cally or epistemologically relevant, precisely when we are trying to learn from it. The 
present essay proceeds with the assumption that this message is not to be taken as 
a sincere one, but is aimed rather at the reader’s own presuppositions about what he 
or she is doing in reading this text. I cannot therefore agree with the view, expressed 
most strongly by Oded Balaban, that “[t]here is no reason to assume that the reader 
himself may become a victim of Socrates’ irony. If this were the case, irony would 
lose its meaning. Irony is not intended to hide ideas. Rather, it is a way to express 
them.” Plato and Protagoras: Truth and Relativism in Ancient Greek Philosophy (New 
York: Lexington Books, 1999), 16. The function of the sort of irony with which we, as 
readers, are confronted in Plato’s works has to do less with a direct transmission of 
an idea to us, as I argue presently, than it has to do with an incentive for us to search 
for particular solutions to the problems raised by Plato’s irony ourselves. For a more 
thorough account of Platonic irony in this view, cf. Alexander Nehamas, The Art of 
Living: Socratic Refl ections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998), 19–45.
2. Notable exceptions are Raphael Woolf ’s essay, “The Written Word in Plato’s Protagoras” 
Ancient Philosophy 19 (1999): 21–30, as well as Hermann Gundert’s “Die Simo-
nides-Interpretation in Platons Protagoras,” Platonstudien (Amsterdam: Verlag B. R. 
Grüner, 1977), 46–64. Joseph Cropsey does note the problematic nature of Socrates’ 
pronouncement here, but offers little in the way of an interpretation: “The reader of 
such words must pause to wonder whether the author of them is not admonishing 
him to put down the book he is holding in his hands and to seek out instead some 
companionable interlocutors with whom, testing one another and the truth about the 
being and becoming of good, he might profi t more than by continuing to speculate on 
the inscrutable intention of his present author. Something, perhaps our waking to the 
difference between the attributive speaker of those words and the ostensive recorder 
of them in writing, keeps us at our reading. At worst, we will have been induced to 
think.” “Virtue and Knowledge: On Plato’s Protagoras,” Interpretation (Winter 1991–92), 
151.
3. Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. 1, trans. G. Highet (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1939), 291–2. Jaeger provides perhaps the most thorough 
account of this transformation of education in fourth- and fi fth-century Athens. 
Cf. also Mark Munn’s The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), 15–91.
4. See Gregory Vlastos’s introduction to the Protagoras, trans. Benjamin Jowett (India-
napolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), viiff.
5. As Francisco Gonzalez emphasizes, the directedness of Hippocrates’ eros is the primary 
issue in this early exchange. See “Giving Thought to the Good Together: Virtue in Plato’s 
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Protagoras,” in Retracing the Platonic Text, ed. J. Russon and John Sallis (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 2000), 115.
6. We see this point borne out more explicitly and forcefully in the Meno, where Meno 
begins the dialogue by asking Socrates how it is that virtue is acquired, which Socrates 
counters by asking, “If I do not know what something is, how can I even know what 
sort of thing it is?” (70b). In each of these dialogues, though in different ways, Socrates 
reorients the focus of questioning from the acquisition of virtue to an investigation 
of what virtue itself is.
7. Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher 
Smith (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), 50.
8. Cf. Jaeger: “[A]s the more binding forces of life—religion, morality, and ‘music,’ which 
for the Greeks always included poetry—lost their power, so the masses escaped from 
the formative infl uence of the spirit. . . . [T]he standards and ideals to which every class 
in the nation once paid allegiance were still announced, and that too with increased 
rhetorical embellishment; but less and less real attention was paid to them.” Paideia: 
The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. 2, trans. G. Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1943), 10.
9. 155d, where Socrates tells Theaetetus: “For this feeling of wonder shows that you are 
a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that 
Iris was the child of Thaumas made a good genealogy.”
10. In addition, Socrates’ appeal to brevity and clarity in speech is further disregarded 
in the extended answer Protagoras gives to the question of goodness at 333e–343c, 
as well as in his objection to Socrates on the matter of the relation between strength 
and power at 350c–351b.
11. The theme of enchantment (khlhqmov~) arises not only in Socrates’ initial char-
acterization of Protagoras as he sees him in Callias’s courtyard, mesmerizing the 
students who follow behind him as he walks to and fro; Socrates admits to being 
held in enchantment at the close of Protagoras’s great speech (328d). The signifi cance 
of this theme within the dialogue has to do, as I see it, with its relation to aporia. If 
Socratic dialectic is to bring about a speaker’s awareness of his aporia with respect to 
a given subject, Protagoras’s brand of speech aims at producing a kind of confusion 
that masquerades as understanding on the part of the listener.
12. In light of this aspect of Protagoras’s approach to wisdom, there is a strong tendency to 
view Meno as a recapitulation of this position to the extent that Meno, too, is content to 
rely upon repeating speeches from memory. Yet, whereas the Meno portrays an aspir-
ing sophist whose capacity to learn is already noticeably stunted, the Protagoras offers 
an implicit account of how the taxation of one’s memory through extended speeches 
contributes at the same time to a stultifi cation of the critical capacities necessary for 
learning. Thus, the Protagoras can serve as a propaedeutic to the Meno by giving one 
possible story of how Meno came to be the challenged learner that he is.
13. Aristotle in fact characterizes sophistic education in general in terms of the distribu-
tion of memorized speeches, referring to the practice of Gorgias as a prime exemplar, 
who “used to hand out speeches to be learned by heart.” Sophistical Refutations 
(183b37–38).
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14. See the early discussion of the relation between the parts of virtue at 329d–333b, as 
well as Protagoras’s position on courage, which begins at 349d. With respect to his 
great speech, Protagoras does not put forward a general position that disagrees with 
popular opinion. The belief that virtue could be taught by any of the noble Athenians 
(the kaloiv kajgaqoiv) is echoed by Anytus, one of Socrates’ accusers, in the Meno 
as well (92e).
15. This is, we should note, not a position unique to Protagoras; it is precisely Gorgias’s 
contention, namely that possession of knowledge of virtue implies thereby that the 
possessor is virtuous (Gorgias 460b). If Protagoras were not, in accordance with 
his reputation, under pressure to exhibit the goodness that he propounds, then his 
guarantees of making his students better each day would appear rather untenable. 
If a student is free to disregard what he or she has learned about the good, pursuing 
instead something else, then Protagoras would not, strictly, have the power to make 
others better (assuming he otherwise possessed and taught such things). This means, 
then, that Protagoras would have to give not only doctrines of good behavior, but 
also awaken a desire for the good on the part of his students. This is, however, just 
the thing that he himself lacks. As we can see later in the dialogue, Protagoras must 
side with Socrates in denying ajkrasiva; if not, then he would have to admit a gulf 
between knowledge and compulsion, and therefore give up his strong claim to make 
others better.
16. Note that the issue of correctness in interpretation forms a central theme of the Ion, 
where Ion boasts of possessing as much knowledge of the arts portrayed in Homer 
as any technician. There are, however, two primary differences between the dialogues 
here. First, the status of goodness, and not art, is at issue in the poetic work; where 
Protagoras sees teaching virtue as a tevcnh among others, whether in poetry or in 
his own doctrines, it is precisely this conception of virtue, and the teaching of it, that 
Socrates resists. Second, Socrates and Ion debate about the correct portrait of tech-
nical matters within Homer, not about the ethical lessons that we may draw out of 
Homer’s text as a whole, in contrast to the way in which Socrates extracts them from 
Simonides’ ode.
17. This is precisely the conclusion at which Thomas Szlezák arrives in his reading of the 
passage at issue. Pointing to the “violence” that Socrates commits upon Simonides’ 
text—namely, that Socrates “goes substantially beyond or past Simonides’ intention” 
by imposing a special ontological meaning back upon the poet’s terms of being and 
becoming—as evidence, Szlezák argues that Plato is here emphasizing the principle 
that “all interpretation is necessarily misinterpretation, at least partially.” Reading Plato 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 37. Yet in order to sustain this claim and to hold Socrates 
guilty of abusing the text, Szlezák appears to assume the very access to Simonidean 
intent that Socrates disavows. Certainly, our lack of such access does not imply that 
all intepretations are valid, and that therefore no violence to texts can be identifi ed. 
However, this lack should at the same time call into question any confi dent claim about 
what the author could possibly have had in mind, particularly when a text is shown 
to suggest readings alternative to the predominant conclusions of an interpretive 
community.
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18. As Jacob Klein puts it, conversely, “Words can be repeated or imitated; the thoughts 
conveyed by words cannot: an ‘imitated’ thought is not a thought.” A Commentary on 
Plato’s Meno (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 17.
19. This notion of becoming and transformation in relation to texts in one’s soul has its 
counterpart in Diotima’s speech in the Symposium at 208a–b: “With regard to the pos-
sessions of knowledge, not merely do some of them grow and others perish in us, so 
that neither in what we know are we ever the same persons; but a like fate attends each 
single sort of knowledge. What we call study (meleta`n) implies that our knowledge 
is departing; since forgetfulness is an egress of knowledge, while study substitutes a 
fresh one in place of that which departs, and so preserves our knowledge enough to 
make it seem the same.”
20. “Relying on Your Own Voice: An Unsettled Rivalry of Moral Ideals in Plato’s Protago-
rasI,” The Review of Metaphysics 53 (December 1999): 291.
21. Contra Woolf (1999), who maintains that interpretation of texts serves as a prelimi-
nary to debating the position one has reached through studying particular writings, 
I see Socrates using proper interlocution, at least in the context of the Protagoras, 
as a preparation for thoughtfully working through texts. Leaving the poets, on the 
conspicuously specious claim that we are unable to uncover their intended meaning, 
is rather the only means—given the state of Protagoras’s thinking—to remove them 
from the violence of sophistic method.
22. A Commentary on Plato’s Protagoras (New York: Peter Lang, 1983), 211.
23. As Gadamer notes, “In the comic confusion between question and answer, knowledge 
and ignorance that Plato describes, there is a profound recognition of the priority of 
the question in all knowledge and discourse that really reveals something of an object. 
Discourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that thing be broken open 
by the question.” Truth and Method, trans. Weinsheimer and Marshall (New York: 
Continuum, 2000), 363.
24. In giving attention to the way in which texts can serve an educative role for the reader 
where they are self-consistent, yet disagree with our own opinions, I am responding 
in particular to Woolf ’s argument (“The Written Word in Plato’s Protagoras,” 28) that 
in stimulating one’s own views on a topic, “it is the peculiarly provocative nature of 
texts containing internal contradiction which the Protagoras privileges in this regard.” 
It seems to me that Woolf takes this position only at the cost of overlooking the fact 
that a substantial portion of the dialogue following the interpretation of Simonides 
is devoted to showing how Socrates’ own interpretation—one that makes the poem 
self-consistent—produces statements that oppose not only the popular conception 
of ajkrasiva, but also the popular conception of courage. On the basis of this con-
sistent reading, Socrates arranges a mock dialogue between the many, on one side, 
and Protagoras and himself on the other. These novel arguments for the power of 
knowledge and the epistemic nature of courage, whether Socrates intends to stand 
by them or not, are both products of a disagreement in views between Simonides, as 
Socrates reads him, and the many.
